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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
T H E L M A B. W A S E S C H A , 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
T E R R A , INC., and 
L A M A R S. WASESCHA, 
Defendants and Appellant, \ Case No. 
T E R R A , INC., a Utah corporation, 
Cross-Claimant and Appellant, 
vs. 
L A M A R S. W A S E S C H A , 
Cross-Defendant and Respondent. 
13668 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE 
This is an action for rescission of a loan transaction, 
cancellation of a real estate mortgage, and recovery of 
amounts paid in excess of the loan principal. Defendant 
Terra, Inc., counterclaimed and cross-claimed for fore-
closure of the real estate mortgage, and defendant La-
1 
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Mar S. Wasescha counterclaimed against Terra, Inc., 
for set off of excess interest and for general relief. 
The trial court rescinded the loan transaction and 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against 
Terra, Inc., for $2,882.73, attorney's fees, and costs. I t 
dismissed the counterclaims and cross-claim. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
There are omissions and inaccuracies in Appellant's 
Statement which necessitate a more complete statement. 
Defendant Terra, Inc., is a Utah corporation or-
ganized in 1964, at which time it had a small loan license 
(R. 149). Commencing as of September 2, 1969, it was 
authorized and empowered to make supervised loans 
(R. 33). The company is examined annually by the 
U.C.C.C. administrator (R. 193). As of June 30, 1971, 
Terra, Inc., had 11 outstanding loans, totaling in excess 
of $28,000.00 (Ex. 14). The corporation's president and 
owner of approximately 90 percent of its stock is Alan 
D. Frandsen, an attorney at law (R. 149, 161), and the 
corporation conducts its business in Mr. Frandsen's law 
office (R. 159). 
The plaintiff, Thelma B. Wasescha, and defendant 
LaMar S. Wasescha are husband and wife. They were 
2 
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married on September 16, 1970, and within a week or 
two after the wedding Mr. Wasescha commenced put-
ting pressure on Mrs. Wasescha to assist him in obtain-
ing a loan from Terra, Inc. He asked her to mortgage 
her home, then in joint ownership with her former hus-
band, but she refused (R. 164). The pressure continued, 
and on October 8, 1970, Mr. and Mrs. Wasescha went 
to the office of Terra, Inc., to take out the loan (R. 
165). There is some dispute in the testimony as to just 
what happened after that. Mrs. Wasescha testified that 
she would not sign the papers until the part containing 
a mortgage on her home was crossed out. She says that 
it was crossed out and that she subsequently signed (R. 
165). The testimony is undisputed that she did not want 
to give a mortgage. Mr. Wasescha so testified (R* 208, 
209), as did Mary Jo Smith, the secretary in the offices 
of Terra, Inc. (R. 187), and Mr. Frandsen (R, 228). 
There was testimony that things were confused at the 
time of this meeting and that there was a shuffling of 
papers back and forth. Apparently Mrs. Wasescha did 
sign a mortgage, but with the understanding that the 
real property had been deleted from it (R. 165). The 
mortgage was not acknowledged before the notary pub-
lic who signed it, but was presented to her by Mr. 
Frandsen (R. 167, 171, 186). 
At that time Terra, Inc., did not give to the Wa-
seschas a statement disclosing the material terms of the 
transaction, or a notice of right to rescind the agreement 
as required for consumer loans under both state and fed-
eral statutes and regulations. 
3 
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I t was Mrs. Wasescha's understanding at the time 
of the transaction that the demand for a mortgage on 
her home had been abandoned and that the note would 
be secured by Mr. Wasescha's interest in an employee's 
stock purchase plan (R. 166). The note (Ex. 1) is con-
sistent with this understanding, the only reference to 
security being the final paragraph: 
The undersigned LaMar S. Wasescha has 
pledged all of the shares he presently holds in 
TransAmerican Employee Lot Purchase Plan, 
approximately 173 shares with an approximate 
value of $2,500.00, said shares are held in trust 
and can be secured by the undersigned by ter-
minating his employment or voluntarily request-
ing a termination of the plan. 
The real property mortgage was recorded by Ter-
ra, Inc., on August 13, 1971 (Ex. 2). 
The note provided that interest would be paid 
monthly for the first six months and that thereafter pay-
ments would be made on principal and interest, the en-
tire balance to be paid within 42 months. It did not spe-
cify how much principal was to be paid monthly. 
In the beginning the interest was not paid as re-
quired. Between April 26, 1971, and August 26, 1971, 
five $100.00 payments were made by Mr. Wasescha 
(Ex. 4, It. 214). Commencing in January, 1972, Mrs. 
Wasescha began making payments of interest and prin-
cipal and continued to make them on a regular basis. On 
June 15, 1973, this action was commenced by Mrs. Wa-
sescha against her husband (from whom she was then 
4 
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separated) and Terra, Inc., in the belief that they were 
both responsible to her (R. 174). Before the action was 
commenced she had reduced the indebtedness from 
$5,496.44 to $4,552.13 (Ex. 5). She continued to make 
payments throughout the pendency of the action. 
Despite the fact that Mrs. Wasescha's payments 
were being accepted on a regular basis (Ex. 5), and 
that there had been no declaration of default, Terra, 
Inc., filed a counterclaim and cross-claim for foreclosure 
of the mortgage (R. 120). Mrs. Wasescha continued to 
make payments on the mortgage indebtedness and 
Terra, Inc., continued to accept them. As of December 
31, 1973, the indebtedness, according to the records of 
Terra, Inc., had been reduced to $3,995.32. 
Prior to January 10, 1973, the Waseschas learned 
that Mr. Wasescha was to be transferred by his em-
ployer to the State of Washington, and it became neces-
sary to clear the title in order to sell her Salt Lake City 
home (R. 171). 
On January 2, 1974, Mrs. Wasescha's counsel tele-
phoned Mr. Frandsen and asked him for the pay off 
figure on the mortgage (R. 234). On the same day Mr. 
Frandsen wrote a letter to counsel stating that the 
amount due and owing on January 10, 1974, was 
$4,015.22, together with court costs in the amount of 
$17.60 and interest at $2.01 per day after January 10 
(Ex .7 ) . 
On January 10, 1974, Mrs. Wasescha completed 
the closing of the sale of her home and at that time paid 
5 
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to Terra, Inc., the full amount requested in Mr. Frand-
sen's letter, $4,032.73 (R. 158). The amounts paid on 
the $5,000.00 note totaled $7,882.73 (R. 158, Ex. 4, 5). 
Terra, Inc., released the mortgage and acknowledged 
that the debt had been "fully paid, satisfied and dis-
charged" (Ex. 6). 
I t is undisputed that no disclosure statement or no-
tice of right to rescind was given to Mr. or Mrs. Wa-
sescha at or about the time the money was lent (Oc-
tober 8,1970) or at any time prior to June 30,1971. Mr. 
Frandsen and his secretary testified that on or about 
June 30, 1971, after an examination by the state and at 
the direction of the administrator, disclosure statements 
and notices of right to rescind were sent to all their bor-
rowers (R. 153, 190, 193) but other evidence casts 
doubt on the testimony. Both Mr. and Mrs. Wasescha 
denied having received such documents; a copy of the 
notice of right of rescission (Ex. 2) was not a duplicate 
of the one said to have been sent, and had not been in 
the file when Mary Jo Smith's deposition was taken. I t 
was prepared and filed in the month before the trial— 
probably in February, 1974 (R. 198). 
Although Mary Jo Smith testified that the notices 
were sent at the examiner's direction on June 30,1971, a 
letter purportedly sent by Terra, Inc., to the Waseschas 
on July 2,1971, stated that the bank examiner had been 
in on July 1, and that he was concerned about the failure 
to record the mortgage on the real property and the fact 
that payments were not made as indicated. Nothing was 
6 
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said about enclosing the documents in question (Ex. 
11). 
The notice of right to rescission referred to the loan 
transaction of October 8, 1970, and stated: 
If you decide to cancel this transaction, you 
may do so by notifying Terra, Inc., at 353 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by 
mail or telegram sent not later than midnight of 
October 11, 1970. (Emphasis added.) 
The statement of transaction (Ex. 13) set out a 
finance charge of $3,150.00, which was inaccurate in 
light of the balloon payment provision of the note, and 
stated that the loan was secured by a real estate mort-
gage. I t contained no reference to the fact that the loan 
was secured by Mr. Wasescha's stock. 
Mrs. Wasescha testified that she had paid all of the 
$3,350.00 shown in the payment book (Ex. 5), and that 
the final $4,032.73 had been made from the proceeds of 
the sale of her home (R. 201). 
As pointed out in Appellant's Brief, a supple-
mental complaint and reply to counterclaim was filed by 
Mrs. Wasescha on March 4,1974, approximately 9 days 
prior to the date set for trial. Appellant failed to point 
out that as of February 16, 1974, Terra, Inc., acknowl-
edged service of the supplemental complaint (R. 54). 
In a motion heard March 11, 1974, Terra, Inc., re-
quested leave to raise the defense of accord and satis-
faction based upon payment of the note and release of 
the mortgage, which motion was denied. 
7 
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Trial commenced on March 13, 1974, and defend-
ant LaMar Wasescha did not appear. No default hav-
ing been requested or entered, the trial proceeded with-
out his participation. 
After hearing the evidence the court concluded 
that a statement of transaction and a notification of 
right of rescission as required by the Uniform Com-
mercial Credit Code, the Federal Truth in Lending 
Act, Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board, and 
regulations of the U.C.C.C. Administrator had not been 
given to the Waseschas. I t concluded that the borrowers 
had a right to rescind the transaction and that Mrs. Wa-
sescha was entitled to recover all sums in excess of the 
principal amount of the note, together with a $700.00 
attorney's fee, and costs. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
T H E MOTION OF A P P E L L A N T TO R A I S E 
T H E D E F E N S E OF "ACCORD A N D SATIS-
F A C T I O N " W A S P R O P E R L Y D E N I E D . 
On March 6, 1974, Terra, Inc., filed a motion for 
leave to file an amended complaint raising the defenses 
of statute of limitations and accord and satisfaction, and 
reasserting its right to recover attorney's fees (R. 44). 
The motion was not supported by any affidavit, the pro-
posed amended pleading was not attached ot the motion, 
and the motion did not "state with particularity the 
S 
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grounds therefor" as required by the provisions of Rule 
7(b) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The district court heard the arguments and state-
ments of counsel, but no record of the hearing was in-
cluded in the record on appeal. 
Although the motion was denominated a motion to 
amend, the accord and satisfaction or "compromise and 
settlement" defense was based upon matters occurring 
subsequent to the filing of the original answer, and 
should properly be treated as a motion to file a supple-
mental pleading. Rule 15 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedures, provides: 
Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are 
just, permit him to serve a supplemental plead-
ing setting fourth transactions or occurrences or 
events which have happened since the date of the 
pleading sought to be supplemented. * * * 
We do not contend that the motion was improper 
because of what it was called, but to point out the rule, 
as stated in 3 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Edition) 
Hl5.16[3]: 
The decision to grant or deny leave to file a 
supplemental pleading is one for the discretion 
of the district court, and will not be disturbed on 
appeal except for abuse of discretion. 
There is nothing in the record to show that the 
court abused its discretion by denying the motion. The 
court did not set out the reasons for its ruling, but it 
might have denied the motion for lack of timeliness; in-
9 
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consistency with the reasserted claim for attorney's fees; 
disruption of the trial schedule because of the possibility 
that trial counsel would have to be a witness; lack of 
contractual elements; the spurious nature of the mort-
gage foreclosure claim; or absence of authority under 
78-51-32 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
I t is well settled that the decisions of the trial court 
on motions and proceedings before it are presumably 
valid. 
In Palfreymen v. Bates and Rogers Const. Co., 
108 Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132 (1945), this court said: 
There is a presumption that the judgment of 
the trial court was correct, and every reasonable 
intendment must be indulged in favor of it; the 
burden of affirmatively showing error is on the 
party complaining thereof [citations omitted]. 
Similarly, this court in Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 
2d 195, 468 P.2d 360 (1970) said: 
Where the court has a statutory alternative 
based on discretion, we take it that there is a pre-
sumption that the judge's conclusion is clothed 
with propriety and bona fides, destroy able only 
by clear evidence adduced by him who attacks it. 
The record here discloses little or nothing indi-
cating that such burden was met. 
And in Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428,150 P.2d 
100 (1944), the court said: 
On appeal the appellant has the burden of 
showing wherein the trial court erred. If the 
record is not sufficient to determine a material 
10 
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question because of the fact that the appellant 
has failed to bring enough of it before us, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of sustaining 
the judgment. 
See also Reid v. Anderson, 116 Utah 455, 211 P.2d 
206, 1949; Burton v. Z.C.M.I., 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 
514 (1952); and Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 
P.2d 680 (1954). 
The general rule is well stated in 5 C.J.S., Appeal 
and Error, §15.41: 
Generally, for the purpose of sustaining the 
judgment being reviewed, the court will make 
all reasonable presumptions with respect to 
amended or supplemental pleadings, in favor of 
the correctness of the trial court's action concern-
ing the same; and presumptions which would 
place the trial court in error ordinarily will not 
be made. 
Unless there is some contrary showing which 
prevents the making of the particular presump-
tion, all reasonable presumptions will be made in 
support of the propriety of the trial court's action 
in allowing or refusing an amendment or supple-
mental pleading * * *. 
In order for the appellant to prevail with respect to 
this matter, he must show both error and prejudice, that 
is, that his substantial rights are affected and that there 
is at least a fair likelihood that the result would have 
been different. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 
P.2d 834 (1951), and Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although accord and satisfaction was not allowed 
to be pleaded, Terra, Inc., was permitted to put before 
the trial court the evidence upon which it relied, on the 
ground that it was material on the questions of waiver 
and mootness. 
The accord and satisfaction was apparently based 
upon the payment of the mortgage by Mrs. Wasescha 
when it became necessary for her to move to the State of 
Washington. But the evidence would not support a 
finding of accord and satisfaction or of compromise and 
settlement. The only dealings were between Alan D. 
Frandsen and Mrs. Wasescha's attorney. Mr. Frand-
sen's testimony is that Mrs. Wasescha's attorney called 
him up and asked for a pay off and that Mr. Frandsen 
told him that he would have his secretary compute it (R. 
237). He was asked about the amount owing on the note 
(R. 238) and about attorney's fees but said he would 
take the principal, interest and costs (R. 239). At that 
time he knew the Waseschas were leaving the state and 
had to have a payoff figure (R. 241). There is no testi-
mony that anything was said about settlement of Mrs. 
Wasescha's claim against Terra, Inc. There is no hint of 
a compromise settlement in Mr. Frandsen's letters of 
January 2 and January 7 (Ex. 7 and 8). In the letter of 
January 2,1974, there is a simple statement that he had 
computed the balance owing on the note and asked for 
that plus his court costs, and that he would execute a re-
lease on payment of the sums mentioned. In his letter of 
January 7, he restated the balance and said, " I will ex-
pect you to hold and not record the attached release 
until I am paid in full." 
12 
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Supporting the view that the court could not have 
found in favor of such a defense is the tenuous nature 
of the counterclaim for foreclosure. The evidence is 
clear that at the time of filing of the counterclaim there 
had been no declaration of default and that payments 
were made by Mrs. Wasescha on a regular basis both 
before and after the institution of this proceeding. 
Despite the introduction by Terra, Inc., of all the 
evidence it had on the negotiations respecting payment 
of the mortgage, the court found as a fact that in making 
the mortgage payment Mrs. Wasescha did not intend 
to and did not waive her rights to claim the recovery of 
the finance charges as sought in the original complaint. 
This is supported by the evidence. I t is common knowl-
edge that one who must clear title to make a sale has no 
choice but to pay the amount claimed by the mortgagee. 
Payment into court would not clear the title and might 
postpone indefinitely the sale of the property. 
I I 
THE LOAN INVOLVED IN THIS CASE WAS 
SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 
AND THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT 
CODE. 
Terra, Inc., takes the position that it was not obli-
gated to give its borrowers disclosure statements or no-
tifications of right to rescission because it was not regu-
larly engaged in the business of making loans. 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Two statutes and a federal regulation are involved: 
the Federal Truth in Lending Act, the Utah Uniform 
Consumer Code, and Regulation Z of the Federal Re-
serve Board. 
Although the state and federal stautes have similar 
objectives, their coverage is defined in different terms. 
The Truth in Lending Act applies to each consumer 
credit transaction by a "creditor." "Credit" and "credi-
tor" are defined in 15 U.S.C. §1602 as follows: 
(e) The term "credit" means the right granted 
by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of a 
debt or to incur debt and defer its payment. 
(f) The term "creditor" refers only to credi-
tors who regularly extend, or arrange for the ex-
tension of, credit for which the payment of a fi-
nance charge is required, whether in connection 
with loans, sales of property, or services, or 
otherwise. The provisions of this sub-chapter 
apply to any such creditor, irrespective of his or 
its status as a natural person or any time of or-
ganization. 
This definition is augmented by Regulation Z of 
the Federal Reserve Board as follows: 
"Creditor" means a person who in the ordinary 
course of business regularly extends or arranges 
for the extension of consumer credit, or offers to 
extend or arrange for the extension of such 
credit. (12 C.F.R., §226.2[m]) 
In the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 70B-3-104 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 a "consumer loan" is a loan 
made by a person "regularly engaged in the business of 
14 
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making loans" with respect to described debtors and 
debts. A "supervised loan" is one type of consumer loan. 
70B-3-102 and 70B-3-501 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
The federal statute thus applies to those who regu-
larly extend or offer to extend credit, while the Utah 
statute applied to those who are regularly engaged "in 
the business" of making specified types of loans. If a 
person regularly extends credit, he is subject to the fed-
eral statute regardless of the business in which he is en-
gaged. "Regularly" does not imply that the extension 
of credit represents any particular percentage of a cred-
itor's activity. The report of the Bankruptcy and Cur-
rency Committee of the House of Representatives, De-
cember 13, 1967, deals briefly with the provision in its 
section by section summary of the Truth in Lending 
Act. The report states: 
Definition of "creditor"—covers only those 
who regularly engage in credit transactions. 
Thus a small retailer who extended credit and 
charged for it in an isolated instance to accommo-
date a particular customer would not be covered. 
(1968 U.S. Code Congressional and Administra-
tive News, Volume I I page 1980.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
We have found no cases construing the Utah stat-
ute, but the Truth in Lending Act has been before the 
courts on several occasions. A very recent case is Eby v. 
Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9 Cir. 1974), brought 
under the civil liability section of the Truth in Lending 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §1640. The realty company claimed it 
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was not a "creditor" within the meaning of the statute. 
The defendant's records showed that it was primarily a 
real estate broker acting as an intermediary between 
purchasers and sellers. During the 19 months preceding 
the lawsuit, it had sold seven parcels of property for its 
own account. In only three instances, (April and Oc-
tober, 1969, and August, 1970) was credit extended by 
Reb Realty. But the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the debtor. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the summary judg-
ment, saying: 
The issue is then presented whether, on the 
facts of record, Reb Realty "regularly extended 
credit" and was thus a creditor within the Act. 
The question is one of first impression upon 
which there is little guidance. The statutory defi-
nition only focuses inquiry on the word "regu-
larly." The Federal Reserve Board's definition, 
contained in its interpretive regulations on the 
Act—Regulation Z—goes but a little further: 
a creditor is one "who in the ordinary course 
of business" regularly extends credit. 12 C.F.R. 
§226.2 (m) (1973). 
The legislative history, though sparse on this 
point, is of some help. In both the house and sen-
ate reports, the only commment relevant to the 
definition of creditor indicates that the term is to 
have a broad scope. "Thus a small retailer who 
extended c r ed i t . . . in an isolated instance to ac-
commodate a particular customer would not be 
covered [by the Act]." H.R.Rep. No. 1040, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1968); S.Rep. No. 392, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967). 1968 U.S. Code 
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Cong. & Admin. News, p. 1962. Reading this 
along with the definitions in the statute and Reg-
ulation Z, the intent seems to have been to except 
from the Act only those lenders who extensions 
of credit are an occasional, isolated, and incident-
al portion of their business. 
Informal letters, issued by the staff of the 
Federal Reserve Board, are a further indication 
that the term "creditor" should be expansively 
read. While these letters are hardly binding on a 
court, they do represent an "experienceCd] and 
informed judgment to which courts * * * may 
properly resort for guidance." [citations omitted] 
In one letter, for example, a home owner was ad-
vised that he would not be a creditor simply be-
cause he accepted a mortgage in the sale of his 
own home. A letter from Milton W. Shober, 
Ass't Director, Nov. 4, 1969, reported at 4 
C.C.H. Consum. Credit Guide 1130,206. More 
importantly, a 1970 staff letter opined that a cor-
poration, distributing its stock on credit, would 
be a creditor for purposes of disclosing the credit 
terms of the sale. "CI]t appears to us that the re-
striction of the application of the Act to 'credi-
tors' was included merely because of the unfair-
ness of placing a burden on a private party to 
make disclosures in connection with his casual 
isolated sales." Letter from Milton W. Shobar, 
Ass't Director, Feb. 19, 1970, reported at 4 
C.C.H. Consum. Credit Guide 1130,313 (empha-
sis added by court). 
The Truth in Lending Act is a remedial stat-
ute designed as much as possible to permit bor-
rowers to make informed judgments about the 
use of credit. To effectuate this congressional 
purpose requires that the Act's terms be liberally 
construed, [citations omitted] Here, realty sales 
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were a significant aspect of appellant's business. 
And in nearly half its sales, it extended credit to 
its customers. They were credit transactions in-
volving a large amount of money and not, after 
all, like granting credit for a bag of groceries. In 
view of this, we cannot say Reb Realty's exten-
sions of credit were the type of isolated inci-
dental transactions the definition of creditor was 
meant to exempt. 
The claim by Terra, Inc., that it does not come 
within the statutes and regulation seems to be an after-
thought, not having been raised in any pleading or in 
the opening statement of counsel (R. 145-147). 
The pleadings and evidence support findings that 
Terra, Inc., regularly makes, and that it is regularly 
engaged in "the business" of making, consumer loans. 
The pleadings tacitly admit the applicability of the 
statutes. In its answer, Terra, Inc., claimed that it had 
complied with the provisions of the Uniform Commer-
cial Credit Code. In its supplemental counterclaim and 
cross-complaint, Terra, Inc., avers that it has complied 
with the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and that 
it is "authorized and empowered to make supervised 
loans in Salt Lake City, Utah, commencing as of Sep-
tember 2,1969" (R. 33, 34). 
According to the testimony of the corporation's 
president and principal shareholder, Alan D. Frandsen, 
the firm was organized in 1964, and "at that time it was 
a small loan—had a small loan license" (R. 149). 
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From this evidence alone the court could find as a 
fact that the company was regularly engaged in the 
business of making consumer loans, absent some believ-
able testimony to the contrary. Both Mr. Frandsen and 
his secretary, Mary Jo Smith, testified that Terra, Inc., 
made only two or three loans a year and that there were 
only five loans outstanding, both at the time this loan 
was made and at the time of the examination by the 
State Department of Financial Institutions on June 30, 
1971. But Exhibit 14 reveals that as of June 30, 1971, 
Terra, Inc., had eleven outstanding loans in the total 
amount of $28,480.77, and that in order for a supervised 
lender's license to be retained it was mandatory that 
Terra, Inc., comply with the Utah Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code and Regulation Z, Truth in Lending Act, 
in regards to making and servicing of the loans. This 
exhibit was introduced by Terra, Inc., and its admission 
was not for any limited purpose. I t is good evidence of 
the number and types of loans and of the regular busi-
ness in which Terra, Inc., was engaged. 
The fact that Terra, Inc., has regularly submitted 
to examination by the State Department of Financial 
Institutions (as U.C.C.C. administrator) also has evi-
dential weight. I t constitutes an admission of the applic-
ability of the Act and of the business of Terra, Inc. 
Moreover, Mr. Frandsen testified that it was his "prac-
tice" not to loan without real property security (R. 227), 
and Mary Jo Smith testified that "most of the notes we 
make are form notes," and that she doesn't "usually" 
mention security in the note (R. 196, 197). 
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The trial court found (R. 12) that the regular busi-
ness of Terra, Inc., included the making of consumer 
loans, and that the loan to the Waseschas was a con-
sumer loan. 
This finding is not only supported by the evidence, 
but demanded by it. Even if Mr. Frandsen's testimony 
were believed, two or three loans a year to "friends and 
people I know" (R. 161) are enough. The loan to the 
Waseschas certainly was not an isolated transaction. 
I l l 
A P P E L L A N T ' S DISCLOSURES D I D NOT 
COMPLY W I T H T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S O F 
T H E U T A H U N I F O R M CONSUMER C R E D I T 
CODE OR T H E F E D E R A L T R U T H I N L E N D -
I N G ACT. 
Both the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the 
Federal Truth in Lending Act give debtors a right to 
rescind transactions in which residences are taken as 
security. The Utah statute, 70B-5-204 Utah Code An-
notated 1953, provides: 
Debtor's right to rescind certain transactions. 
— (1) Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion, in the case of a consumer credit sale or con-
sumer loan with respect to which a security inter-
est is retained or acquired in an interest in land 
which is used or expected to be used as the resi-
dence of the person to whom credit is extended, 
the debtor shall have the right to rescind the 
transaction until midnight of the third business 
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day following the consummation of the transac-
tion, or the delivery of the disclosure required 
under this section and all other material disclos-
ures required by this act, whichever is later, by 
notifying the creditor, in accordance with the 
rules of the administrator, of his intention to do 
so. The Creditor shall clearly and conspicuously 
disclose, in accordance with the rules of the ad-
ministrator, to the debtor in a transaction subject 
to this section the rights of the debtor under this 
section. The creditor shall also provide, in ac-
cordance with the rules of the administrator, an 
adequate opportunity to the obligor to exercise 
his right to rescind any transaction subject to this 
section. (Emphasis added.) 
The Federal Truth in Lending Act is substantially 
the same, except that it refers to "consumer credit trans-
actions" and to regulations of the Federal Reserve 
Board rather than those of the administrator. 15 U.S.C. 
§1635. 
The administrator and the Federal Reserve Board 
have both adopted regulations governing notifications 
of right of rescission. 
"Regulations pursuant to the Utah Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code" were adopted by the administrator 
effective January 18, 1971. Section 1.9(2) provides: 
Notice of opportunity to rescind. Whenever 
a customer has the right to rescind a transaction 
under Paragraph (a) of this section, the creditor 
shall give notice of that fact to the customer by 
furnishing the customer with two copies of the 
notice set out below, one of which may be used 
by the customer to cancel the transaction. Such 
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notice shall be printed in capital and lower case 
letters of not less than 12 point bold face type on 
one side of a separate statement which identifies 
the transaction to which it relates. Such state-
ment shall also set forth the entire paragraph (d) 
of this section, "Effect of Rescission." / / such 
paragraph appears on the reverse side of the 
statement, the face of the statement shall state: 
"see reverse side for important information about 
your right of rescission/' Before furnishing 
copies of the notice to the customer the creditor 
shall complete both copies with the name of the 
creditor, the address of the creditor's place of 
business, the date of consummation of the trans-
action, and the date, not earlier than the third 
business day following the date of the transac-
tion, by which the customer may give notice of 
cancelation. (Emphasis added.) 
[The notice is in the form set forth in Exhibit 9.] 
Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board, 
adopted pursuant to authorization in the Federal Truth 
in Lending Act, is substantially identical. 
The notification produced at the trial by Terra, 
Inc., was defective in at least two particulars. I t did not 
set forth the "date, not earlier than the third business 
day following the date of the transaction, by which the 
customer may give notice of cancelation." The notice, 
sent no earlier than June 30, 1971, provided: 
If you decide to cancel this transaction, you 
may do so by notifying Terra, Inc., at 353 East 
Fourth South, S.L.C., Utah 84111, by mail or 
telegram sent not later than midnight of October 
11,1970. * * * [Emphasis added.] ' 
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Information as to the effect of the rescission was 
printed on the reverse, but the front did not contain the 
required "see reverse side * * *." 
The court properly held that this notice did not 
comply with the U.C.C.C. or the Truth in Lending Act, 
and that the statement of transaction claimed to have 
been sent with the notification of right of rescission was 
inadequate. 
Since all of the material disclosures required by the 
statutes were not made to the Waseschas at any time 
prior to the filing of suit by Mrs. Wasescha on June 15, 
1973, the three day statute of limitations was never ac-
tivated. 
The statutory scheme is to require more than token 
compliance. Creditors must make the disclosures and 
give the notices in accordance with the rules of the ad-
ministrator and the Federal Reserve Board. I t is no 
answer to say that the debtor was told he had some 
rights and was obligated to find out whether the notice 
meant what it said. 
In Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F.Supp. 1099 (D.C. Cal. 
1973) the court was faced with a similar problem. At 
the time they applied for the loan on June 14, the bor-
rowers were furnished with a notice of right to rescind 
which stated that the debtors had to rescind by June 19, 
although the loan was not consummated until June 20. 
The court held that the statement of right to rescind 
was inadequate, saying: 
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In addition to the failure to disclose informa-
tion concerning the terms of the loan, defendants 
failed to properly inform plaintiffs of ther right 
to rescind. As discussed, when plaintiffs applied 
for a loan, they were provided with a notice of 
their right to rescind in the form prescribed by 12 
C.F.R. §226.9(b). The form, however, states 
that the loan was consummated and the three day 
rescission period began to run on June 14, and 
that plaintiffs had to rescind by June 19. In fact, 
as defendants themselves have argued in this 
proceeding the loan was not consummated until 
June 20. Thus this statement failed to properly 
disclose the details of plaintiffs' right to rescind 
contrary to 15 U.S.C. §1635(a); 12 C.F.R. 
§226.9 (b). 
IV 
T H E E V I D E N C E A N D F I N D I N G S SHOW 
T H E A M O U N T OF I N T E R E S T P A I D BY 
MRS. WASESCHA. 
Inasmuch as this is an action for rescission, the 
court properly considered not only the amounts repaid, 
but the amounts received by Mrs. Wasescha from the 
loan proceeds. She testified that she received $2,000.00 
(R. 175). Mr. Wasescha testified that she had received 
$2,000.00 to $2,500.00 (R. 213). 
Mrs. Wasescha made all of the payments shown in 
the Terra, Inc., payment book (Exhibit 5), which 
totaled $3,350.00. She made the final payment of 
$4,032.00 from the proceeds from the sale of the home 
(R.201). 
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Mrs. Wasescha had been joint owner of the home 
with her former husband (R. 164). Later she and Mr. 
Wasescha purchased her former husband's interest (R. 
182). Thereafter, Mr. Wasescha conveyed his interest 
to Mrs. Wasescha and disclaimed any interest in the 
property (R. 108). There is no doubt that the home was 
hers, as were the sale proceeds. In his testimony Mr. 
Wasescha stated that he had "sent payments of $500.00, 
as I remember." Appellant has tortured this remark 
into testimony that he had made two payments (perhaps 
more) of $500.00 each, but the records of Terra, Inc., 
preclude such conclusion. 
The payment book (Exhibit 5) was sent to Mrs. 
Wasescha in January, 1972, The only payments made 
by anyone other than Mrs. Wasescha were made prior 
to that date. The Terra account card (Exhibit 4) shows 
that five payments were made prior to January, 1972, 
each in the amount of $100.00. 
Mrs. Wasescha received not more than $2,500.00. 
She paid to Terra, Inc., $7,382.73, or $4,882.73 more 
than she received. I t is technically arguable that the 
court should have awarded her judgment against Terra, 
Inc., for the larger sum, with a judgment over against 
Mr. Wasescha for $2,000.00—but the effect on Terra, 
Inc., wouldn't be changed. 
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V 
T E R R A , INC., W A S NOT E N T I T L E D TO 
A N Y I N T E R E S T ON T H E A M O U N T S LOAN-
E D TO T H E W A S E S C H A S . 
The District Court held that the Waseschas were 
entitled to rescission of the loan transaction and that 
Terra, Inc., was obligated to refund all amounts paid in 
excess of the principal. 
This holding is required by the applicable statutes. 
I t is provided in 70B-5-204 Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
When a debtor exercises his right to rescind 
under subsection (1), he is not liable for any 
credit service charge, loan finance charge, or 
other charge, and any security interest given by 
the debtor becomes void upon the rescission. 
An almost identical provision is found in 15 U.S.C. 
§1635(b): 
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind 
under subsection (a) of this section, he is not 
liable for any finance or other charge, and any 
security interest given by the obligor becomes 
void upon such a rescission. 
Under 70B-3-109 Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
(1) "Loan finance charge" means the sum of 
(a) all charges payable directly or indirect-
ly by the debtor and imposed directly or in-
directly by the lender as an incident to the ex-
tension of credit, including any of the follow-
ing types of charges which are applicable: in-
terest or any amount payable under a point, 
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discount, or other system of charges, however 
denominated, premium or other charge for any 
guarantee or insurance protecting the lender 
against the debtor's default or other credit 
loss; and 
(b) [other charges not material to the issue 
in this case.] 
Although the term finance charge is not specific-
ally defined in the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§1605 sets out the items which are included in the fi-
nance charge, among them interest, time price differen-
tial, service or carrying charge, loan fee, fee for investi-
gation or credit report, finder's fee, etc. Regulation Z, 
12 C.F.R. §226.2 (q) defines "finance charge" to mean 
"the cost of credit determined in accordance with 
§226.4." The later section includes interest as part of the 
finance charge. 
The six percent interest provided in 15-1-1 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 applies only where there is no 
governing contract or statute. The section has no appli-
cation to situations in which a transaction is rescinded 
for violation of the Uniform Commercial Credit Code 
or the Truth in Lending Act. 
The intent of the two statutes is clear. A creditor is 
not to receive any return on his money if he violates cer-
tain provisions of the statutes. Usury statutes historic-
ally have been so applied. 
I t has been held that 15 U.S.C, §§1635 and 1640 
are not exclusive remedies, and that a debtor may obtain 
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both rescission and a penalty of up to $1,000.00. See 
Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9 Cir. 1974), 
cited supra. No penalty was sought in this case. 
VI 
T H E T R I A L COURT C O R R E C T L Y H E L D 
T H A T T H E R E S P O N D E N T S W E R E E N -
T I T L E D TO RESCISSION. 
The appellant, Terra, Inc., argues that Mr. Wa-
sescha was not entitled to rescission because he did not 
ask for it, and seems to argue that Mrs. Wasescha was 
not entitled to rescind because Mr. Wasescha did not 
join her in seeking that relief. 
Although Mr. Wasescha did not specifically ask 
for rescission in his counterclaim, he did set out a claim 
supporting rescission. Paragraph 2 of the counterclaim 
(R. 109) avers that Terra, Inc., failed to make the dis-
closures required by law, particularly those relating to 
the security interest. And in his demand for judgment, 
Mr. Wasescha asked for general relief. 
Many courts today hold that the demand for judg-
ment is not part of the complaint (or counterclaim), and 
that the court should grant relief justified by the aver-
ments of the pleading and the evidence at the trial. 
Other cases regard the demand for judgment as part of 
the complaint, but hold that a demand for general re-
lief permits the court to enter a judgment for any relief 
supported by the pleadings and evidence. 
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In her complaint, Mrs. Wasescha asked for rescis-
sion of the entire transaction, and for a determination of 
the amounts of money owed by her and her husband, re-
spectively. The court tried the issue, rescinded the trans-
action, and entered a judgment that Mrs. Wasescha 
was entitled to return of all of the amounts that were 
paid to Terra, Inc., in excess of the principal amount 
lent. 
Under the provisions of 70B-5-204 Utah Code An-
notated 1953, a "debtor" is given a right to rescind the 
transaction in which his residence is taken as security. 
Under the provisions of 15 U.S.C. §1635 the "obligor" 
is given the right to rescind the transaction. Under Reg-
ulation Z a "customer" is given the right of rescission. 
12 C.F.R. §226.9. Under 12 C.F.R. §226.2 (o) "cus-
tomer" means: 
A natural person to whom consumer credit is 
offered or to whom it is or will be extended, and 
includes a co-maker, endorser, guarantor, or 
surety for such natural person who is or may be 
obligated to repay the extension of consumer 
credit. (Emphasis added.) 
The provisions of 12 C.F.R. §226.9 (f) relating to 
joint ownership is meant to expand the class of per-
missible plaintiffs, and "joint owners" should be con-
strued to include all who have an interest in the resi-
dence, including a possessory interest. 
Whether Mrs. Wasescha could have maintained 
this action without joining Mr. Wasescha is academic, 
because she did join him. Under Rule 19, Utah Rules 
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of Civil Procedure, a person who should join as a plain-
tiff may be made a defendant. In this case Mrs. Wa-
sescha made her co-obligor a party defendant and 
placed before the court all of the facts and circumstances 
which would permit it to enter a judgment to which the 
evidence entitled the parties, whether or not the plead-
ings were amended. Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
V I I 
A P P E L L A N T W A S NOT E N T I T L E D TO B E 
A W A R D E D ATTORNEY'S F E E S F R O M LA-
MAR S. W A S E S C H A . 
The trouble with the claim of Terra, Inc., for at-
torney's fees, is that it did not prove any right to recover 
on the note. 
At the time the action was brought, Mrs. Wasescha 
was making regular payments of principal and interest. 
No default had been declared, and Mrs. Wasescha con-
tinued to make regular payments on the note until she 
sold her home and paid off the principal balance. 
I t is apparent that the counterclaim on the note and 
mortgage was filed in retaliation after Mrs. Wasescha 
filed her complaint. The note required only that pay-
ments be made on principal and interest. Those pay-
ments were being made and the note was not due until 
April 7, 1974. 
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V I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT P R O P E R L Y A W A R D -
E D T H E A T T O R N E Y S F E E S TO MRS. WA-
SESCHA. 
In support of the argument that Mrs. Wasescha 
was entitled to no attorney's fees in this case, appellant 
has cited two sections of the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code. H e did not cite 70B-5-202(8) Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953: 
In any case in which it is found that a creditor 
has violated this Act, the court may award rea-
sonable attorney's fees incurred by the debtor. 
I X 
R E S P O N D E N T S DID NOT W A I V E T H E I R 
R I G H T TO R E S C I N D . 
Appellant correctly observes that there are limita-
tions upon the extent to which the debtors can be said to 
have waived their rights under the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, 
a buyer, lessee, or debtor may not waive or agree 
to forego rights or benefits under this act. 
(2) A claim by a buyer, lessee, or debtor 
against a creditor for an excess charge, other vio-
lation of this act, or civil penalty, or a claim 
against a buyer, lessee, or debtor for default or 
breach of a duty imposed by this act, is disputed 
in good faith, may be settled by agreement. 
(70B-1-107 Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
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Although the District Court ruled that accord and 
satisfaction, more properly compromise and settlement, 
was not an issue in the case, the appellant brings it in by 
citing the above section and using a claimed agreement 
to try to show a waiver. But the testimony of Mr. 
Frandsen, which begins at R. 234, is insufficient to 
establish any agreement or waiver: 
Mr. Roe called my office and indicated how 
much was owing on the note. I says, "as of what 
date?" I think he first indicated February 1, so 
I had my secretary bring the interest up to that 
date. * * * H e said that they were going—they 
wanted a release of mortgage. I gave him a pay 
off figure then I think I sent him a letter subse-
quently confirming or at least advising him what 
the daily interest rate was according to the cut 
off date. * * * 
As to the amount demanded by Terra, Inc., I 
never made any demand upon Mr. Roe or Mr. 
Wasescha or Mrs. Wasescha. H e called up and 
wanted to know what the payoff was and I told 
him I would have my secretary compute it. * * * 
I t was shortly, oh, about the 5th or 6th of Jan-
uary [Mr. Roe] called my office. The conversa-
tion was very brief. H e indicated what's the 
amount owing on the note? I said, "as of what 
date?" And I believe he gave me some cut off 
figure, and he said that the Waseschas were go-
ing to pay the note, I said, "well, I have expend-
ed $17.00 and I believe 16 cents in costs." * * * 
Well, then he mentioned, "what about attor-
ney's fees?" And I said, "well"—I hesitated and 
I thought this was one matter that I would like 
to have behind me and I said just pay me the 
principal amount and interest and costs. 
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There was never any discussion, suggestion, or in-
timation to the effect that Mrs. Wasescha was interest-
ed in dismissing her lawsuit. The trial court heard the 
evidence and found: 
In January, 1974, it became necessary for the 
plaintiff to sell her property at 577 North Hills 
Drive because of the transfer of her husband's 
employment from Salt Lake City, Utah to 
Seattle, Washington, and in order to effect the 
sale plaintiff was required to obtain a release of 
the mortgage taken by defendant Terra, Inc. 
(R. 12 and 13). 
In making the payments to defendant Terra, 
Inc., including the payment of January 10,1974, 
plaintiff did not intend to and did not waive her 
right to rescind the loan transaction of October 
8, 1970. 
There was no bargaining with respect to settle-
ment, and there was no consideration for any agreement 
on the part of Mrs. Wasescha. Terra, Inc., gave up 
nothing. The entire counterclaim for foreclosure was 
spurious, inasmuch as the mortgage indebtedness had 
never been declared in default and Mrs. Wasescha had 
continued to make payments before and after this action 
was filed. 
X 
T H E PROVISIONS OF 70B-5-204 U T A H CODE 
A N N O T A T E D 1953 A R E NOT UNCONSTITU-
T I O N A L L Y VAGUE. 
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Claiming that no citation of authority is necessary, 
the appellant cites none in support of the proposition 
that the Utah Consumer Credit Code is unconstitution-
ally vague in defining consumer loan with reference to 
persons "regularly engaged in the business of making 
loans." 
I t is a difficult argument to answer without either 
(1) merely saying that the statute is not vague and un-
certain, or (2) citing the hundreds of cases in which 
terms with varying degrees of meaning have been held 
to be sufficiently certain under the due process clauses 
of the United States and State constitutions. 
Some general rules relating to vagueness and un-
certainly, however, may be helpful. As stated in 82 
C.J.S., Statutes, §68, p. 113: 
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void 
merely because general terms are used therein, 
or because of the employment of a term, without 
defining it, where such term is one commonly 
used or understood, or where such term is one 
that has acquired a well defined meaning, is suf-
ficiently known or understandable to enable 
compliance with the statute, or has acquired an 
established meaning through established prece-
dents, technical knowledge, or the sense and ex-
perience of men. 
This court has stated that a statute will not be held void 
for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical, effect 
may be given to it, that neither absolute exactitude of 
expression nor complete precision of meaning are ex-
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pected in a statute, and cannot be required. State v. 
Packard, 122 Utah 2d 369, 250 P.2d 561. (1952). 
In Unified School District No. 255, 204 Kan. 282, 
463 P.2d 499, (1969) the Supreme Court of Kansas 
said: 
A statute will not be declared void for vague-
ness and uncertainty where it employes words 
commonly used, previously judicially defined, or 
having a settled meaning in law. (50 Am Jur., 
Statutes, §473, pp. 486, 490) 
I t is submitted that the term "regularly engaged in 
the business of making loans," is easily defined, each of 
the words having a customary meaning. The word "reg-
ularly" has been used many times in various state and 
federal enactments. 
While situations might develop in which particular 
parties would have doubts as to whether they were "reg-
ularly engaged in the business of making loans." Such a 
situation is not present here. Terra, Inc., was licensed 
originally as a small loan company, and subsequently 
as a supervised loan company, and making loans is its 
business. I t is not in a shadowy area. 
CONCLUSION 
Terra, Inc., is a licensed supervised loan company. 
I t has engaged in business as a lender since 1964. At the 
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time of the examination by the Department of Financial 
Institutions on June 30, 1971, it had 11 outstanding 
loans totaling more than $28,000.00. 
Terra, Inc., is regularly engaged in the business of 
making loans, and it regularly makes loans. I t is subject 
to the regulatory provisions of the Truth in Lending 
Act and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 
In making the loan to the Waseschas in this case it 
did not comply with the requirements of either act. I t 
failed to furnish adequate disclosure statements or a 
satisfactory notification of right to rescind. 
Under the provisions of the statutes and the regu-
lations, the Waseschas had a right to rescind the trans-
action, which they did by court process, and Terra, Inc., 
was not entitled to any finance or other charge. To allow 
the company interest at the statutory rate would be to 
eliminate express wording from the statutes. 
After a full hearing the trial court found the facts 
in favor of the Waseschas, and against Terra, Inc. I t 
dismissed the counterclaim of Terra, Inc., "no cause of 
action." Thus there would be no right to attorney's fees 
on that counterclaim. 
I t is submitted that despite the myriad claims of 
error on the part of Terra, Inc., it was given a fair trial. 
All of the evidence was considered, and the court prop-
erly applied the governing statutes and the legal prin-
ciples. 
The judgment of the District Court should be af-
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firmed and remanded to the District Court for the pur-
pose of fixing an attorney's fee to be awarded respond-
ents for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Thelma B. Wasescha 
Herschel J . Saperstein 
Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
LaMar S. Wasescha 
37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
DEC 6 1975 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
